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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Merna Jean Tranmer appeals from her judgment of conviction for felony 
attempted destruction of evidence. She asserts that the district court erred when it 
denied her motion to suppress, and that the evidence presented was insufficient to 
support her conviction. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Officer Justin Cyr of the Twin Falls Police Department initiated a traffic stop on a 
· van for failure to use a turn signal. (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) 
Ms. Tranmer was driving the van. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Tranmer was known to associate with 
drug users in the area. (PSI, p.3.) Officer Cyr noticed that Ms. Tranmer had red sores 
on her face and was very fidgety. (PSI, p.3.) The officer also noticed that Ms. Tranmer 
moved rapidly inside the van while she was looking for her identification, and rapidly 
passed over items she was looking for several times. (PSI, p.3.) Officer Kevin Loosli 
and his K9 arrived during the stop, and after performing a free air sniff of the van, the K9 
alerted to the odor of illegal drugs. (PSI, p.3.) Officer Cyr then asked for and obtained 
Ms. Tranmer's consent to search the van, her person, and her purse. (PSI, p.3.) 
The officers saw small crystals or shards in the bottom front pocket of 
Ms. Tranmer's purse. (See PSI, p.3.) Ms. Tranmer reportedly became nervous, started 
swaying back and forth, and attempted to take the purse away. (PSI, p.3.) A small 
crystal from the purse tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. (PSI, p.3.) 
The officers arrested Ms. Tranmer and read her Miranda 1 rights. (PSI, p.3.) 
1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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During a search of the van, officers found a small black digital scale on the 
passenger side dooL (PSI, p.3.) The scale had small crystals on it consistent with the 
appearance of methamphetamine. (PSI, p.3.) The small crystals from the purse were 
placed in a small plastic baggie with a gross weight of 0.6 grams. (PSI, p.3.) The scale 
tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. (PSI, p.3.) 
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Ms. Tranmer committed the 
crime of possession of a controlled substance, felony, in violation of !.C. § 37-
2732(c)(1 ). (R., pp.9-10.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound 
Ms. Tranmer over to the district court. (R., pp.47-48.) The State filed an Amended 
Criminal Complaint alleging that Ms. Tranmer committed the crimes of possession of a 
controlled substance and attempted destruction, alteration, and/or concealment of 
evidence, felony, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-2603 and 18-306. (R., pp.49-51.) The State 
subsequently filed an Information for Felonies charging her with the above two offenses. 
(R., pp.53-55.) At the arraignment, Ms. Tranmer entered a not guilty plea to the 
charges. (R., p.58.) 
Ms. Tranmer then filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support, 
requesting that the district court suppress evidence gathered by the State pursuant to 
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.79-84.) Specifically, Ms. Tranmer 
asserted that Officer Loosli did not have Ms. Tranmer's freely-given consent to search 
her purse, and that Officer Cyr illegally extended the traffic stop. (R., pp.81-83.) After a 
hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court ordered counsel to submit 
supplemental briefs. (R., p.88.) 
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The State filed a Motion to Re-Open and Augment Record Re: Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress, requesting permission to augment the record with additional 
testimony and evidence on the presumptive testing performed on the digital scale at the 
time of Ms. Tranmer's arrest, and on the policies and routine procedures regarding 
inventory searches of Ms. Tranmer's property incident to arrest and as part of jail 
booking procedures. (R., pp.90-93.) At the hearing on the State's motion, Ms. Tranmer 
objected to reopening the motion to suppress. (R., p.94.) The district court then heard 
the additional testimony. (R., p.94.) 
The district court subsequently issued a Memorandum Opinion where it denied 
the motion to suppress. (R., pp.95-112.) The district court found that there was no 
illegal detention. (R., p.101.) The district court also found, under the totality of the 
circumstances, that Ms. Tranmer's verbal consent to search her purse and the van was 
voluntary and not coerced. (R., p.103.) Additionally, the district court determined that 
Officer Loosli had probable cause to search the van under the automobile exception 
once the drug-detection dog altered on the van. (R., pp.103-04.) Further, the district 
court found that the methamphetamine in the purse would have been inevitably 
discovered in a search incident to arrest. (R., pp.107-08.) 
The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found Ms. Tranmer not guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.146-48.) The jury was unable to come to 
a unanimous conclusion on the attempted destruction of evidence count, and the district 
court declared a mistrial for that count. (See R., pp.147-48.) The district court 
subsequently issued a Judgment of Acquittal as to the possession of a controlled 
substance count. (R., pp.178-79.) The State then requested that the attempted 
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destruction of evidence count be set for trial, and the district court set that count for a 
second trial. (R., p.181.) 
During the second jury trial (only on the attempted destruction of evidence 
count), Officer Cyr testified that, when Ms. Tranmer tried to grab the purse from Officer 
Loosli, she struck her fingers inside the purse, tried to pull out the inner lining of the 
pocket, and tried to take her thumb and run it down the seam of the pocket. (Tr., p.386, 
L.17 - p.387, L.8.) Officer Loosli testified that he believed Ms. Tranmer had rubbed her 
thumb through the crease of the pocket "in an attempt ... to destroy the white crystal 
substance in the bottom of the purse." (Tr., p.402, Ls.13-16.) The audio recording of 
the traffic stop was also played for the jury. (E.g., p.400, Ls.23-25; see State's Ex. 1.) 
Ms. Tramner moved to dismiss after the close of the State's evidence. 
(R., pp.192-93.) The district court denied the motion for dismissal. (R., p:193.) The 
jury found Ms. Tranmer guilty of attempted destruction of evidence. (R, pp.193, 195.) 
Ms. Tranmer subsequently filed, pro se, a "Motion to Set Aside the Verdict on 
Count II Charge of Attempted Destruction of Evidence for Violation of Due Process and 
Equal Protection." (R., pp.223-29.) The district court refused to hear the motion, and 
indicated it would have also denied it on the merits. (Tr., p.450, L.15 - p.451, L.4.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of one and one-half years, with one 
y_ear fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Ms. Tranmer on probation for a period 
< •• 
of one and one-half years. (R., pp.237-41.) 
Ms. Tranmer filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of 
Conviction. (R., pp.249-52.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Tranmer's motion to suppress? 
2. Was the evidence presented insufficient to support Ms. Tranmer's conviction for 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Tranmer's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Tranmer asserts that the district court erred when it denied her motion to 
suppress. The traffic stop was unlawfully extended. Ms. Tranmer did not voluntarily 
consent to the search of her purse. The inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to 
the shards found in the purse. Thus, Ms. Tranmer's constitutional rights were violated, 
and the district court should have granted the motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review And A licable Law 
When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, an 
appellate court defers to the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, 
and exercises free review over the district court's determination as to whether 
constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. 
Donato, 135 Idaho 469,470 (2001). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
17 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. A search or seizure 
conducted without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable. State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 
835, 837-38 (2004). To overcome the presumption, the State bears the burden of 
showing that (1) the warrantless search or seizure fell within a well-recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) the search or seizure was reasonable in 
light of all of the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 838. 
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Traffic stops, a form of limited investigatory detention, are seizures for purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); State v. 
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). Thus, 
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement applies to traffic stops. See 
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. 
Generally, a seizure must be based on probable cause to be reasonable. Id. 
However, a limited investigatory detention, based on less than probable cause, is 
"permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person 
has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 498 (1983)). ''Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts 
and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts." Id. While the quantity 
and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that 
necessary to establish probable cause, reasonable suspicion "requires more than a 
mere hunch or 'inchoate or unparticularized suspicion."' Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 
496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). "Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is 
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before 
the time of the stop." Id. 
"To meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness, an investigative 
detention must not only be justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, but also 
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the 
first place." State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003). However, 
[a]ny routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious circumstances which 
could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. The 
officer's observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop 
may-and often do-give rise to legitimate reasons for particularized lines 
of inquiry and further investigation by an officer. 
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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "the length and scope of the stop may be 
lawfully expanded if the detaining officer can 'point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion."' Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ). 
C. The Traffic Stop Was Unlawfully Extended 
Ms. Tranmer asserts that the traffic stop was unlavvfully extended. The district 
court determined that "the initial purpose of the traffic stop was reasonably expanded" in 
the time between when Officer Cyr entered his patrol car to write the citation and when 
Officer Loosli obtained Ms. Tranmer's consent to search her purse, because "Officer 
Cyr had made observations of suspected drug use, and the drug dog had alerted on the 
van." (R., p.100.) According to the district court, "The traffic stop was not prolonged 
while awaiting the dog search inasmuch as Cyr was still working on writing the traffic 
citation. The Court finds that 10 to 12 minutes, under the circumstances of this case, is 
a reasonable time for completing this task." (R., p.100.) "The two-minute 'interrogation' 
was likewise reasonable. By this time, the original purpose of the traffic stop had been 
properly extended." (R., pp.100-01.) The Court determined that Officer "Loosli's 
questioning . . . was reasonable in that it was de minimis and incidental to the 
detention." (R., p.101.) Thus, the district court found that there was no illegal detention. 
(R., p.101.) However, the traffic stop was actually unlawfully extended. 
The traffic stop was unlawfully extended by Officer Cyr, such that it was not 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first 
place." See Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983. The district court found that it took Officer Cyr 
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about 10 to 12 minutes to complete the citation.2 (See R., pp.100-01.) The citation 
form is a one-page document that largely involves fiiling in blanks. (Def. Ex. A.) Based 
on the brevity and simplicity of the citation form, Ms. Tranmer submits that the officer, as 
a matter of law, should have completed the citation in less time than 10 to 12 minutes. 
Thus, Officer Cyr unlawfully extended the traffic stop. See Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983. 
The district court also found, "The two-minute 'interrogation' [by Officer Loosli] 
was likewise reasonable." (R., p.100.) "While Loosli's motives for questioning may not 
have been altruistic, they were reasonable especially in light of the fact that Tranmer 
told the officers that the van belonged to someone else. Continued investigation may 
well have exonerated Tranmer from arrest, albeit it ultimately did not." (R., p.101.) The 
district court determined that Officer Loosli's questioning "was reasonable in that it was 
de minimis and incidental to the detention." (R., p.101.) 
The district court's determination that Officer Loosli's questioning was reasonable 
and not an unlawful extension of the traffic stop is erroneous, because it is based on the 
continued investigation not exonerating Ms. Tranmer. But an extension of a traffic stop 
cannot be justified by facts discovered after the officers extend the stop. The extension 
of a traffic stop must be justified by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 
See State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012) ("[W]here officers abandon the initial 
purpose of a routine traffic stop and extend it to allow for a drug dog search, the 
extension must be justified by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot."). 
"Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality 
of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop." Bishop, 146 
2 However, as Ms. Tranmer's counsel pointed out, there was a pause in the audio 
recording where the officer stopped recording. (See Tr., p.48, L.22 - p.49, L.20.) 
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Idaho at 810. Officers, at or before the time a stop was extended, would not know if a 
subject would be exonerated by continued investigation. The district court therefore 
erred when it determined that Officer Loosli's extension of the stop was reasonable 
under the totality of the circumstances, because it considered circumstances not known 
to the officers at the time. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. 
Under the totality of the circumstances here, the extension of the traffic stop by 
Officers Cyr and Loosli was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
initially justified the stop. See Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983. Thus, the traffic stop was 
unlawfully extended, in violation of Ms. Tranmer's constitutional rights. See id. 
D. Ms. Tranmer Did Not Voluntarily Consent To The Search Of Her Purse 
Ms. Tranmer asserts that she did not voluntarily consent to the search of her 
purse. The district court found, under the totality of the circumstances, "that the verbal 
consent to search her purse and the van was voluntary and not coerced." (R., p.103.) 
However, the totality of the circumstances here shows that Ms. Tranmer did not 
voluntarily consent. 
As discussed above, the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 17 guarantee 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; 
Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. A search or seizure conducted without a warrant is 
presumptively unreasonable. LaMay, 140 Idaho at 837-38. To overcome the 
presumption, the State bears the burden of showing that (1) the warrantless search or 
seizure fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) the 
search or seizure was reasonable in light of all of the surrounding circumstances. Id. 
at 838. 
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Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 
833 (2002). The State has the burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily 
given. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 
548 (1968)). "[VV]hether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product 
of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the 
totality of all the circumstances." Id. at 227. 
Factors to be considered include whether there were numerous officers 
involved in the confrontation; the location and conditions of the consent, 
including whether it was at night; whether the police retained the 
individual's identification; whether the individual was free to leave; and 
whether the individual knew of his right to refuse consent. Although the 
presence of multiple officers does not, standing alone, establish coercion, 
and there is no requirement that police inform the individual he is free to 
leave or that he has a right to refuse consent, these factors are 
nevertheless relevant when assessing the totality of the circumstances. 
State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 778 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). 
The district court found that the following facts were relevant to the question of 
whether Ms. Tranmer's consent was voluntarily. (R., p.103.) The traffic stop happened 
at night, namely just after midnight. (Tr., p.10, Ls.8-10, p.29, Ls.17-19.) At least two 
police officers, Officers Cyr and Loosli, were present when Ms. Tranmer consented to 
the search of the purse. (See Tr., p.14, Ls.12-15, p.31, Ls.7-11.) Officer Cyr had 
Ms. Tranmer's driver's license and proof of insurance. (See Tr., p.12, Ls.10-15.) The 
officers did not inform Ms. Tranmer of her right to leave. (Tr., p.36, Ls.8-11.) The 
district court found that Officer Loosli's tone was accusatory, but not threatening. 
(R., p.103.) Officer Loosli asked Ms. Tranmer several times about her drug use and the 
drug use of her friend who owned the van. (Tr., p.30, Ls.19-22, p.37, Ls.13-16, p.39, 
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Ls.11-17.) Ms. Tranmer stated that she was sick and tired, and that she wanted to go 
home. (Tr., p.36, Ls.14-18.) 
The district court found that Ms. Tranmer was defensive and stated multiple 
times she had done nothing wrong, but that Officer Loosli did not threaten her. 
(R., p.103.) Ms. Tranmer stated that the police were harassing her. (Tr., p.40, Ls.14-
18.) The district court observed "there is no other evidence in the record as to 
Tranmer's subjective thoughts." (R., p.103.) The district court also found that "Officer 
Loosli did not engage in a subtle police questioning technique, but rather explicitly 
stated to the Defendant what he was doing and why he was doing it." (R., p.103.) 
"Tranmer voluntarily consented to a frisk of her person and the van." (R., p.·103.) When 
Officer Loosli found a cigarette lighter on Ms. Tranmer's person, he immediately asked 
to search her purse, and she immediately consented. (R., p.103.) 
Based on the above factors, Ms. Tranmer submits that, under the totality of the 
circumstances here, her consent to the search of the purse was not voluntary. See 
State v. Rector, 144 Idaho 643 (Ct. App. 2006) (affirming the district court's finding that 
a defendant's act of pulling methamphetamine from her pocket was not voluntary, 
where the female defendant had been confronted at night by two armed officers, the 
officers questioned, frisked, and questioned the defendant again, and the defendant had 
not been informed of her right to refuse consent or told she was free to leave). Like the 
defendant in Rector, 144 Idaho at 646, Ms. Tranmer had been confronted at night by at 
least two officers. (Tr., p.10, Ls.8-10, p.14, Ls.12-15, p.29, Ls.17-19, p.31, Ls.7-11.) 
The officers here, like the officers in Rector, 144 Idaho at 646, did not tell Ms. Tranmer 
that she was free to leave. (Tr., p.36, Ls.8-11.) Further, both the defendant in Rector, 
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144 Idaho at 646, and Ms. Tranmer were subjected to repeated police questioning. 
(Tr., p.30, Ls.19-22, p.37, Ls.13-16, p.39, Ls.11-17.) 
Other relevant factors also indicate that Ms. Tranmer's consent was not 
voluntary. See Garcia, 143 Idaho at 778. The officers had Ms. Tranmer's driver's 
license and proof of insurance. (See Tr., p.12, Ls.10-15.) It does not appear that the 
officers told Ms. Tranmer of her right to refuse consent. (See Tr., p.10, L.14- p.42, 
L 10.) Based on the above factors, under the totality of the circumstances, 
Ms. Tranmer's consent to the search of her purse "was not an act of free will but the 
product of coercive circumstances." See Rector, 144 Idaho at 646. She did not 
voluntarily consent to the search of her purse. 
Because Ms. Tranmer's consent to the search of her purse was not voluntary, 
the officers required a warrant before they could search the purse. See Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 222; LaMay, 140 Idaho at 837-38. The officers did not obtain a warrant, 
and the search of the purse therefore violated Ms. Tranmer's constitutional rights. See 
LaMay, 140 Idaho at 837-38. 
E. The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Does Not Apply To The Shards Found In 
Ms. Tranmer's Purse 
Ms. Tranmer asserts that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to the 
shards found in her purse here. The district court determined that "the search incident 
to an arrest doctrine applies in this case and would inevitably led to the discovery of 
methamphetamine in Tranmer's purse. Tranmer would have been arrested following 
the discovery of the scale in the van." (R., p.108.) However, the State did not prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Tramner would have been arrested. 
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"[Vl/)hen ... the evidence in question would inevitably have been discovered 
without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to 
provide a taint and the evidence is admissible." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 
( 1984 ); see Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 497-98 (2001 ). "The inevitable discovery 
doctrine applies when a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the 
information would have inevitably been discovered by lawful methods." State v. Gibson, 
141 Idaho 277, 286 n.4 (Ct App. 2005) (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 444). However, 'The 
doctrine is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by substituting what the 
police should have done for what they really did." State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 170 
(Ct. App. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The district court found that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied because 
Ms. Tranmer would have been arrested for the methamphetamine found on the scale in 
the van, and the methamphetamine in the purse would have been found in the ensuing 
search incident to arrest. (R., pp.107-08.) The district court essentially determined that, 
because the officers may have been able to arrest Ms. Tranmer for the 
methamphetamine found on the scale, inevitable discovery applies. But that is 
"substituting what the police should have done for what they really did." See Liechty, 
152 Idaho at 170. Thus, the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to the shards 
found in the purse. 
In sum, the district court erred when it denied Ms. Tranmer's motion to suppress. 
The traffic stop was unlawfully extended. Ms. Tranmer did not voluntarily consent to the 
search of her purse. The inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to the shards found 
in the purse. Thus, Ms. Tranmer's judgment of conviction for attempted destruction of 
evidence should be vacated, the district court's denial of her motion to suppress should 
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be reversed, and the case should be remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
II. 
The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To Support Ms. Tranmer's Conviction For 
Attempted Destruction Of Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Tranmer asserts that the evidence presented at her second trial was 
insufficient to support her conviction for attempted destruction of evidence. Specifically, 
there was insufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have found that the 
State met its burden of proving that Ms. Tranmer's actions were a substantial step 
towards consummation of the crime. 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable I aw 
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. State v. 
Taylor, 157 Idaho 186, _, 335 P.3d 31, 34 (2014). An appellate court only inquires 
into "whether there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have 
found that the State met its burden of proving the essential elements of the charged 
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at _, 335 P.3d at 35 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion." Id. at_, 335 P.3d at 35 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). "[T]he Court is required to consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, but will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury on issues of 
witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
the evidence." Id. at_, 335 P.3d at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires that a conviction be supported by legaliy sufficient evidence. See 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979). Sufficient evidence is "evidence 
necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of 
every element of the offense." Id. at 316. Additionally, Idaho Criminal Rule 29 provides 
that a district court may set aside a jury verdict and enter judgment of acquittal "if the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." I.C.R. 29(a). 
Ms. Tranmer's conviction for attempted destruction of evidence was based on 
two statutes, I.C § 18-2603 and I.C. § 18-306. Section 18-2603 provides: 
Every person who, knowing that any book, paper, record, instrument in 
writing, or other object, matter or thing, is about to be produced, used or 
discovered as evidence upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or 
investigation whatever, authorized by law, wilfully destroys, alters or 
conceals the same, with intent thereby to prevent it from being produced, 
used or discovered, is guilty of a misdemeanor, unless the trial, 
proceeding, inquiry or investigation is criminal in nature and involves a 
felony offense, in which case said person is guilty of a felony and subject 
to a maximum fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and a maximum 
sentence of five (5) years in prison. 
Section 18-306 prohibits attempts to commit crimes. "[A]n attempt consists of 
two elements: an intent to do an act or bring about certain consequences which would 
in law amount to a crime, and an act in furtherance of that intent which goes beyond 
mere preparation." State v. Glass, 139 Idaho 815, 818 (Ct. App. 2003). The second 
element requires a "substantial step" towards consummation of the crime: "To go 
beyond mere preparation, the actions of the defendant must reach far enough toward 
the accomplishment of the desired result to amount to the commencement of the 
consummation of the crime." Id. at 818-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he 
defendant's acts, taken as a whole, must strongly corroborate the required culpability; 
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they must not be equivocal." Id. at 819 (citing United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 
1228 (11 th Cir. 2002)). 
C. There Was Insufficient Evidence Upon Which A Reasonable Jury Could Have 
Found The State Met Its Burden Of Proving Ms. Tranmer's Actions Were /j_ 
Substantial Step 
In this case, the evidence presented was insufficient to support Ms. Tranmer's 
conviction for attempted destruction of evidence, because there was insufficient 
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have found that the State met its burden 
of proving that her actions were a substantial step towards consummation of the crime. 
Ms. Tranmer's actions were equivocal as to whether she tried to destroy the shards, or 
instead merely reached into the purse and drew her thumb across the shards to get a 
better sense of what the officers said they discovered. 
The testimony of the officers established that the shards found in the purse were 
"very small." (Tr., p.394, Ls.17-21, p.404, Ls.10-12.) Officer Cyr indicated that the 
shards were, individually, too small to weigh at the police department's scale, which 
measures weights as low as a tenth of a gram. (Tr., p.394, L.22 - p.395, L.6.) Officer 
Cyr also testified that it could be hard to see at 12:30 in the morning on a dark street, 
and that it could be hard to see in the bottom of the pocket in the purse if one were not 
trained to look for such substances. (Tr., p.395, Ls.10-20.) Officer Loosli testified that 
even the biggest shard was small. (Tr., p.404, Ls.10-12.) 
Trial testimony also established that Ms. Tranmer wanted to see the shards. 
Officer Loosli testified that, even after the officers handcuffed Ms. Tranmer, she 
continued to insist on wanting to see what the officers said they found. (Tr., p.404, 
Ls.19-25.) He showed her more clearly with the flashlight. (Tr., p.405, Ls.1-4.) That 
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Ms. Tranmer wanted to see the shards is further evidenced by the audio recording of 
the traffic stop. (E.g., State's Ex. 1, 06:50.) 
Because the shards found in the purse were very small, and because 
Ms. Tranmer wanted to see the shards, her actions did not strongly corroborate the 
required culpability for attempted destruction of evidence. See Glass, 139 Idaho at 819. 
Rather, her actions were equivocal as to whether she tried to destroy the shards, or 
instead merely reached into the purse and drew her thumb across the shards to get a 
better sense of what the officers said they discovered. See id. 
Because Ms. Tranmer's actions did not strongly corroborate the required 
culpability, there was insufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have 
found that the State met its burden of proving that Ms. Tranmer's actions were a 
substantial step towards consummation of the crime. See id. at 818-19. Thus, the 
evidence presented was insufficient to support Ms. Tranmer's conviction for attempted 
destruction of evidence. See Taylor, 157 Idaho at_, 335 P.3d at 34. Because there 




For the above reasons, Ms. Tranmer respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
her judgment of conviction for attempted destruction of evidence, reverse the district 
court's denial of her motion to suppress, and remand her case to the district court for 
further proceedings. Alternatively, Ms. Tranmer respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse her judgment of conviction for attempted destruction of evidence. 
DATED this 24th day of February, 2015. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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